Rapid development of networks and communications makes security a more and more crucial problem. To provide security for di erent systems, many communication security protocols are proposed. Such protocols must be proved correct before they can be used in practice. Formal veri cation techniques are promising methods to verify protocols and have been receiving a lot of attention recently. In this paper, we survey several security protocols and formal veri cation techniques to verify the protocols.
Introduction
With the advances in computer and communication techniques, security has become more and more crucial for many systems. To guarantee security in computer communications, we m ust consider the possible actions of an intruder or attacker, spy, enemy, etc. An intruder may be passive or active. As shown in Figure 1 , there may be four possibilities that an intruder can attack communication between two honest agents A and B. Among which, the rst eavesdrop is a passive attack while the other three are active attacks. In the case of "Eavesdrop," an intruder R gets to know information sent by an honest party A to another honest party B without their notice. But the intruder doesn't modify the information. In the case of "Intercept," R intercepts the information from A without notice. A doesn't know such information hasn't reached B and B doesn't know that A sends some information to him. In the case of "Fake," R fakes as A and sends to B some information. B believes that it is A who sends this information, but A doesn't know anything at all. In the case of "Modi cate," R intercepts the information from A to B rst. After modifying the informatioin, R sends the new information to B. Neither A nor B knows this information has been modi ed.
Certain protocols are proposed to provide protection for systems from those attacks. However, there may be some potential aws in these protocols. An intruder may discover such aws and thus breach the security through them. Examples include the Needham-Schroeder key distribution protocol 23 and a protocol in the CCITT X.509 draft standard 7 . According to Denning and Sacco 7 , the former protocol allowed an intruder to pass o an old, compromised session key as a new one. Burrows, Abadi and Needham showed that for the latter protocol, an intruder could cause an old session key as a new one 42 . Besides these two, numerous other aws in protocols have been revealed. So before the protocols are put into practice, their correctness and safety m ust be proved. To prove whether a protocol is secure or not, there are several options:
1. One may exhaustively test the protocol to check if there is a aw. 2. One may test some particular scenarios and try to uncover a aw. 3. One may formally verify if the protocol is secure. That is to say, one may verify whether the speci cation of the protocol satis es the desired security requirements.
Then what are the advantages and disadvantages of these options? For the rst option, if a aw does exist, exhaustive search will reveal it at last. But, it is not practical and feasible to generate and test all paths and situations for complex largescale systems. For the second method, though test cases set becomes much smaller, a problem is that if the scenarios are not chosen correctly and appropriately, no aw will be revealed. But this is only a false appearance.
Due to the drawbacks of the rst two options, much research has focused on the third method. Formal methods have long been used in the analysis of communication protocols, and some promising work was done in the analysis of cryptographic protocols in the late 70's and early 80's 32 . Initially, Needham and Schroeder 46 attempted to use formal methods for security protocol analysis. However, Dolev and Yao 18 acturally started the work in this area. And Dolev, Even and Karp 19 developed a set of algorithms for deciding the security of a restricted class of protocols. The application of formal methods to cryptographic protocols became more popular in the early 90's, when several researchers were able to nd heretofore undiscovered security a ws in cryptographic protocols by using formal analysis techniquess. Several tools for the analysis of security protocols, such as Miller's Interrogator 45 , Meadow's NRL Protocol Analyzer 9 , and the Longley-Rigby tool, have been developed.
The goal of formal veri cation is to provide a rigid and thorough means to prove the security properties of a system. When various security protocols are concerned, di erent v eri cation techniques may b e employed. Formal veri cation techniques have several bene ts:
They remove a m biguity in the speci cation. Then no misunderstanding will occur. They identify precisely both the properties a certain protocol aims to satisfy and assumptions and environment under which they hold. They give a thorough insight of the strengths and weaknesses of protocols. They are systematic and exhaustive. They provide certi cation. They provide tools both at the speci cation level and at the implementation level.
This paper describes some security properties in Section 2. It presents some security protocols providing such properties and categorizes them in Section 3. It discusses main formal veri cation techniques in Section 4. We conclude this paper with some new research i n terests in this area.
Security Properties
Systems in di erent elds exhibit di erent security properties. In general, security properties include the following:
1 Con dentiality Secrecy Secret information exchanged should be restricted to honest parties of the communication. No one else is permitted to know secret information such as a session key used in encryption. This property is the most essential element for a security system.
Authentication
It should be guaranteed that an initiator of a session really communicates with the expected responder of the session. That is to say, a third party that intends to impersonate either side is not permitted. Authentication is provided by means of ensuring the data source and destination, and it is usually achieved through digital signatures and certi cates.
NINon Interference 50
During the transmission of information, NI property requires that secret information won't leak to intruders. The communication system should have capabilities against all higher level potential interactions of other agents. This is achieved by controlling the whole ow o f information directly instead of controlling over subjects to objects. Actually NI is also referred to as an approach for guaranteeing such security properties in computer systems.
All properties described above are general purpose properties required by almost all security protocols. With continuing growth of electronic commerce, some additional properties for electronic commerce protocols should be considered. Next, we introduce a couple of them.
Atomicity
Either all operations of an electronic transaction fully complete, or fully abort. Any i n termediate state with only part of money or goods exchanged is not permitted. Moreover, the atomicity property should be preserved even if communication fails between some of the parties.
Fairness
Fairness property requires that no protocol participant gains an advantage over other participants. For example, for a protocol in which one party exchanges one item of its own for another item of the other party, if the protocol is fair, it must ensure that at the end of the exchanging process, only one of the following two cases is the result. The rst case is that each party receives the item it wants and gives its own item to its counterpart. The second case is that none of the parties receives any information about the other's item or loses its own item.
Security Protocols
In order to provide the above security properties, a number of security protocols have been proposed. Most of them adopt some similar ideas and common techniques. In this section, we summarize several security protocols and categorize them according to certain criteria.
Protocol Based on Cryptographic Mechanisms
Formal veri cation techniques of security protocols 5 A set of protocols are based on cryptography. We call such protocols cryptographic protocols. They aim to enable parties to communicate securely over an insecure network through cryptographic mechanisms, such as data encryption and decryption. A cryptographic protocol is precisely de ned as a sequence of communication and computation steps. Generally speaking, cryptographic protocols require that two parties in a session rst agree on keys related to their communication. Only after they both know the keys, is exchanging information between them enabled. They use these keys to encrypt decrypt information. Some researchers also call such protocols Key Exchange Protocols. Depended on whether the keys used in encryption and decryption are the same, there are two catalogs of cryptography: symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography.
Symmetric cryptographic protocols
Traditional cryptography applies symmetric algorithms such as DES: Digital Encryption Standard, in which both encryption and decryption share a common key: shared-key. Some researchers also call symmetric cryptography protocols shared-key protocols.
The following graph illustrates symmetric cryptography. A Key Distribution Center KDC is often needed. It sends secret keys through secure channels to the Encrypt side, where cleartext is encrypted using the keys and becomes ciphertext. In the Decrypt side, ciphertext is decrypted using the same secret keys sent b y KDC and becomes cleartext. Here, fXg Ka stands for the ciphertext of X encrypted using key K a . N a ; N b are both nonces. A nonce is a randomly generated value originally known only by its generator. We will discuss nonces in more detail in section 3.2.1. K a ; K b ; K ab are all keys. A; B are identi ers of two sides.
A initiates the session and generates a nonce N a to identify the run. A uses its own key K a to encrypt N a together with identi ers of its own and its recipient, then sends this ciphertext and its corresponding cleartext to the other side B. After B receives A's message, he forwards it to the authentication server S, together with a nonce of his own and the ciphertext of N a ; A ; B encrypted with K b . S generates a new session key K ab and packages it separately for A and B with their own nonces, then sends the two packages and N a back to B. B decrypts the last part of the message and checks whether the the nonce he received is the same as what he just sent out. If they are the same, he will accept the session key K ab and forward the rest to A. Similarly, A also checks the nonce and if the anwswer is also "yes" he will accept that session key, too. Afterwards, both A and B can begin their communication with this common session key K ab .
Such schemes provide con dentiality of information but little authentication. Neither do they validate the integrity of the data transmitted. Additionally, a drawback of such s c hemes is that they require large-scale distribution of the shared keys.
Asymmetric cryptographic protocols
An alternative method is asymmetric cryptography, or public-key cryptography. It applies to two mathematically linked keys. If one of the two keys is used to encrypt some information, the other key must be used to decrypt the ciphertext. One of the two keys is kept secret by a certain agent and is referred to as the "private" key of this agent. This private key represents the identity of its owner. The second key, called the "public" key, is made available to the world.
There are several protocols in this category, such as IKE Internet Key Exchange protocol, SET Secure Electronic Transactions Protocol, TMN protocol, and the famous Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol 23 . The last one has been taken as a paradigmatic example for analysis by many v eri cation techniques, because of its simplicity and being well-known. The protocol aims to provide mutual authentication. After both agents involved in a communication session con rm the identity of the other side, they can exchange information.
We suppose that an agent A w ants to establish a session with another agent B . A is the initiator while B is the recipient. S i s t h e trusted key server. There are seven steps in the initial version of Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. The following graph illustrates these steps. 
Protocol Based on Main Mechanisms to Provide Security
To a c hieve a common security property, s a y, authentication property, di erent protocols use di erent mechanisms. Here, we categorize protocols according to the primary mechanisms.Protocols in one category may use techniques used in other categorizes as well.
Protocols utilizing nonces
A "nonce" is a randomly generated value originally known only by its generator. The main function of "nonce" is to verify "authentication." Authentication is the mechanism for proving identities over network systems. This goal is often achieved by possessing some particular information, or a "secret." The ISO IEC 9798-1 states that "An entity to be authenticated proves its identity b y showing its knowledge of a secret." Here, nonce plays the role of the secret.
When an agent A wants to initialize a session with another agent B, A may generate a nonce and encrypts it together with other information using some certain encryption methods. Such methods should guarantee that only B can decrypt the message. Then A sends the encrypted message to B and waits for the response. If someone returns this nonce to A, A will assume that the responder is really B and can identify B's authentication. This is the general idea of protocols based on nonces.
Many protocols use nonces, such as the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol introduced in section 3.1.2.
Protocols only utilizing session keys
Some protocols only take advantage of session keys without nonces, such as TMN protocol 24 . TMN is a key distribution protocol for digital mobile communication systems, in which each user terminal in the network communicates with another user via a network center. The protocol employs the following two sorts of encryption:
Standard An encryption function E is used. Every initiator and responder knows how to produce Em given a message m, but only the server knows how t o decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original m.
Vernam The Vernam encryption of two k eys k 1 and k 2 , which is written as V k 1 ; k 2 is their bit-wise exclusive-or. Note that V k 1 ; V k 1 ; k 2 = k 2 , so if an agent knows k 1 , then he can decrypt V k , 1; k 2 to obtain k 2 .
The TMN protocol for establishing a session key involves exchanging four messages. See the graph below:
Initiator Server
Responder (4) When the initiator A wants to connect with the responder B, h e c hooses a key k a , encrypts it using the function E, and sends it to the server.
S ! B : S:B:A
The server sends a message to the responder B, telling it that A wants to start a session with it. The server forms the Vernam encryption of the two k eys, and returns it to A.
When A receives this message, it can decrypt it using its own key k a to recover the session key k b .
Protocols utilizing time-stamp
It is a principle that an old message used in a previous session, such as session key, can't be used in a new session. That is to say, the freshness property should be preserved. Kerberos is claimed as the rst protocol using "time-stamp," which represents the current time to guarantee freshness in which time-stamp represents the current time.
Graph below illustrates the basic Kerberos protocol 27 . Kerberos is a shared-key protocol, which normally relies on a trusted third party. In fact, Kerberos relies on two. The rst is the Kerberos Authentication Server abbreviated as Kas, the second is the Ticket Granting Server abbreviated as Tgs. The following steps describe the three phases of Kerberos Version IV.
i Authentication In this phase, A logs onto the network. A sends its identi er to K a sand K a s replys to it with a session key Authkey and an encrypted ticket Authticket. They are encrypted using A's shared key that K a sretrieved from the database. The Authkey has a lifetime of several hours. A is automatically logged out when this key expires.
ii Authorization In Kerberos, there are four global constants for evaluating time-stamp: AuthLife, ServLife, RecentAuth, and RecentResp. If a message in a session has a time-stamp "older" than corresponding the Lifetime constant, then most likely, the message will be judged to be fake.
Protocols Based on Network Environment
Some protocols aim at providing security o ver a Local Area Network LAN, such as the Kerberos mentioned above, while some others try to provide security o ver the Internet. With the development of electronic commerce, secure communication over the Internet is in great need. Both protocols protecting security a t the web browser level and at the electronic transaction level are required.
Protocols for security of web browser
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Many w eb browsers use the protocol SSL Secure Sockets Layer. This protocol has several versions, the latest of which is called TLS Transport Layer Security 35 . This is a very complicated protocol.
The main concept in TLS is the handshake. A TLS handshake involves a client, such as a web browser A, and a web server B. Figure 6 illustrates a simpli ed version of TLS.
Client Server

Client Hello
A, Na, Sid, Pa
Server Hello
Nb At the start of the handshake, A contacts B, presenting a session identi er S i d , its public key certi cate P a and a nonce N a . B responds with another nonce N b and its public key certi cate P b together with S i d . Then A generates a pre , master , secret, a 48-byte random string, and sends it to B encrypted with his public key. Now both parties calculate the master-secret M from the nonces and the pre-mastersecret, using a secure pseudo-random-number function PRF. They also calculate session keys and MAC secrets from the nonces and master-secret. Each session involves a pair of symmetric keys: A uses one of them and B uses another. Before sending application data, both parties exchange " nished" messages to con rm all details of the handshake and to check that cleartext parts of messages have not 12 Handbook of Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering been altered.
Electronic commerce p r otocols
Electronic commerce is potentially one of the most important I n ternet application areas . A number of protocols for electronic commerce have been proposed, such as DigiCash, Open Market, CyberCash, First Virtual, and NetBill. They are all appropriate for medium to large transactions 58 , 47 .
But there are also some inexpensive transactions, 50 cents and less. If the protocols refered to above are used for them, the transaction costs will become a signi cant o r e v en dominant component of the total purchase price. To solve this problem, some micro-payment protocols have been proposed, such as Eran Gabber's Agora, and Millicent.
We use NetBill and Millicent a s t wo examples and introduce them as follows.
NetBill
NetBill is a dependable, secure and economical payment method for purchasing digital goods and services over the Internet. NetBill enables consumers and merchants to communicate directly with each other, using NetBill to con rm and ensure security for all transactions. See the 
Millicent
Millicent is designed to provide a mechanism for securing micro-payments when the cost of the protocol out-weights the cost of the transaction. Millicent addresses this problem by providing lightweight secure transactions. The trust model de nes three roles: vendors, customers, and brokers. Brokers act as intermediaries between the vendors and the customers. Millicent use accounts based on a "scrip." A scrip represents an account of a customer which is established with a vendor. The value of the scrip is the balance of the account. At a n y given time, a vendor keeps open accounts of the recently active customers. When the customer makes a purchase with a scrip, the cost of the purchase is deducted from the scrip's value and a new scrip with a new value is returned as change. When the customer has completed a series of transactions, he can "cash in" the remaining value of the scrip and close the account. Brokers serve as accounting intermediaries between customers and vendors.
There are also further categories for electronic protocols. For example, fair exchange is proposed to provide fairness to both parties involved in an electronic transaction. There are two main types of this kind of protocol to solve the fair exchange problem.
Gradual exchange protocol
The idea of this method is that the parties release their items in small amounts, so that at any given moment, the amount of knowledge on both sides is approximately the same. Trusted third party In this method, a trusted third party supervises the communication between two parties and ensures that neither side can receive the item it wants before releasing its own item.
Formal Veri cation Techniques for System Security
The process of formally proving that the model of a system satis es the speci cation of requirements, is called formal veri cation. Formal veri cation techniques play an important role in the eld of security. Based on many researchers' work, we summarize three main research directions of formal methods in the eld of security. One of them uses modal logic; another is based on state enumeration exploration; the third is theorem proving. Next, we i n troduce these techniques with illustration using several real examples.
Techniques Using Modal Logic
Modal logic consists of various statements about belief in or knowledge about messages in a distributed system, as well as inference rules for deriving new beliefs from available beliefs and or new knowledge from available knowledge and beliefs. 14 
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The former corresponds to logic of belief, while the latter logic of knowledge. Logic of belief is useful in evaluating trustworthiness. So generally speaking, belief logic is limited to the analysis of the authentication property of protocols.
BAN logic, proposed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham, is perhaps the best known and most in uential modal logic 7 . It builds upon statements about messages sent and received throughout the process of a protocol run. It is designed speci cally to reason about authentication protocols. When we i n tend to verify a certain protocol, rst we should assume an initial set of beliefs and inference rules, as well as de ne the notions of adequacy using BAN. Then from the initial set of beliefs, using the inference rules, we can derived other beliefs. After all beliefs are generated, we c heck whether the set of beliefs is adequate based on the de nition made before. If the answer is "yes," the protocol is correct. Otherwise, the protocol may h a ve a ws. Compromises have to be made between precision and conciseness or simplicity. It has been successfully used to nd previously unknown aws in a protocol that appeared in a draft recommendation for the CCITT X.509 standard.
Other logics and computation models like GNY 28 , NPA, AT, VO, SVO 32 are all related to BAN logic to some extent. But they are restricted from the point of view of participants. Annette et al propose a new semantics for BAN logic 2 . The semantics enable reasoning knowledge and, as a result, about the correctness of the participants' beliefs.
Bieber's CKT5 and Syverson's KPL are examples of logic of knowledge. Some researchers design logic which reasons about a hybrid of belief, knowledge and trust. For example, Rangan's logic is about trust and belief; Moser's logic reasons about knowledge and belief. They have di erent advantages and therefore di erent scopes of application.
Generally speaking, protocol veri cation based on a modal logic is a deductive reasoning process. Before a deduction process proceeds, rules of inference and axioms should be speci ed. Then the process proceeds in four steps 14 :
Formally specify steps of a protocol in the language of the logic. Formally specify the desired protocol goals. Start with the initial protocol assumptions, build up logical statements after each protocol step using the logical axioms and inference rules. Compare these logical statements with the desired protocol goals to see if the goals are achieved.
Co ey and Saidha proposed a new logic of both knowledge and belief 14 . They used the logic to analyze the Needham-Schroeder protocol and revealed a known aw. As illustrated in section 3.1.2, the Needham-Schroeder protocol has seven steps. They used the proposed logic to formally state the protocol goals as follows rst: 4 . K B;t7 9t; t0 t t 7; S A; t; efnBg; K B tn refers to the time at the end of protocol step n. S; t ; x means sends message x at time t. K ;t means knows statement at time t.
Then the initial assumptions relating to the protocol participants are outlined:
. K A;t0 8i; i 2 f E NTg; 8t; t t0; :L i;t nA 6. K B;t0 8i; i 2 f E NTg; 8t; t t0; :L i;t nB L ;t x means knows and can reproduce object x at time t. E NTis the set of all possible entities.
Then they examine the message exchanges in order to verify the four desired protocol goals. Some axioms are used during the process. As a result, some conclusions are not compatible with the expected goals, which indicates that the protocol contains some security a ws and requires some additional steps in order to ful l its objectives.
Since the initial protocol assumptions, protocol steps, inference rules and axioms are all nite and usually not large sets, the scale problem for using this technique is not a big problem. The rst reason is that, quite often, after each protocol step, the set of logical statements doesn't grow sharply. The second reason is that once we nd the desired protocol goals are included in the statements set, we don't need to continue the building statements process.
This technique requires translating a protocol into a set of logic formulas. This process is called idealization and is usually done manually. So it is error-prone and not systematic. This is a disadvantage of this method.
Techniques Using State Enumeration Exploration
State enumeration technique deals with systems of limited size. It models a certain protocol as a nite state system and veri es by exhaustive search that all reachable states satisfy some properties. Because veri cation is performed on a nite model, the process of veri cation can be automatic. Model checking is such a technique and has received a lot of attention recently.
Dolev and Yao's work forms the basis for this kind of method. Much research has been devoted to this direction. Miller uses Interrogator, a nite-state tool, to exhaustively search the state space and try to nd a path from the initial state to the nal state. The Longley-Rigby tool is similar to Interrogator but allows human intervention. Kemmerer models systems in a conventional formal speci cation language Ina Jo 49 . His method is modeling a protocol as a communication state machine and modeling security properties as state invariants and then trying to prove these invariants are preserved at each transition. Another well-known method is by Meadows et al 9 . Her tool is NRL Protocol Analyzer in which a n insecure state might be speci ed and then e orts are made to construct a path to that state from the initial state. If such a path is found, then the protocol being tested is not secure. Lowe and Roscoe 24 have used CSP model checker FDR to perform nite-state analysis of cryptographic protocols. Dang 59 used ASTRAL, a high-level formal speci cation language for real-time systems, and its model checker to verify the Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol and revealed the aw already found. Marrero used Brutus, a special-purpose model checker, to verify fteen classic authentication protocols and electronic commerce protocols, including 1KP, 2KP and NetBill.
Model checking attempts to check whether a property of a nite state machine holds. The property and the machine could be expressed in the same language or in di erent languages. In FDR, both of them are expressed in CSP. The protocol is described as a CSP process, say Prot. The property is another CSP process, Proc. In this case, in order to determine whether the property one set of traces holds for the machine the second set of traces, we should test whether Prot's set of traces are a subset of Proc's set of traces. In other cases, the expression of the property and the machine could be in di erent languages. The property can be expressed using a logical formula and the machine can be described as a set of states and a state transition function. Since the machine has a nite number of states, an exhaustive search is done to check that the logical formula holds at every state.
Next, we i n troduce an example of using CSP and FDR to verify NetBill 47 .
Netbill is illustrated in section 3.3.2. There are three agents in this protocol: the consumer, the merchant and the bank. In the CSP model, these three agents are described as three processes. A CSP process denotes a set of sequences of events, and an event represents a state transitions. The following is the consumer process: The merchant and bank processes are expressed in the same way. The money automicity property can be speci ed as :
Formal veri cation techniques of security protocols 17 We rst combine the consumer, merchant, and the bank processes with an appropriate communication process, then hide all irrelevant e v ents, and get a result system called "SYSTEM1."
Finally we use an FDR command to check whether the system satis es the money automicity property.
Check1 "SPEC1" "SYSTEM1"
This technique has two bene ts. It is completely automatic, and in addition, if the property being checked doesn't hold, a counterexample is produced.
For this technique, the complexity relies on the properties of the protocol. Since all reachable states are generated and an exhaustive search is to be done, if the nite state system corresponding to a protocol is not bounded or has a very large scale, the technique would be not appropriate for the analysis. In general, the state system of a security protocol is always bounded and not very large, so model checking the state space is not impractical.
Theorem Proving 4.3.1. General method
Theorem proving is based on logic theories. Generally speaking, the proving process includes a deduction on a nite model rather than its generalization. Concerning the scale problem, these approaches further rely on the observation that logic used to reason about security protocols has a nite number of rules of inference that grow in a controlled manner. It is the small size of the numberofentities in the model and the small size of the number of rules in any given logic that enable the checking to be performed fast.
Stated simply, the method is to build the entire theory, T h , given a logic and a model of the protocol. Since the model is nite and since the logic's rules always shrink or grow in a controlled manner, the theory generated is nite. Then we are expected to check whether a property, phi, of a protocol holds. The problem boils down to a simple membership test: Is phi in T h ?
Here we give an example of Darrell and Jean 16 . Their technique, called "theory checking," consists of the following basic steps:
Given a nite set of axioms and controlled-growth rules, their tool automatically generates a checker,C. Given the protocol, P, for which property phi will be checked, encode the initial assumptions and messages of P as formulas; call this set T 0 . Using C, exhaustively enumerate the theory, T , that is, the set of facts formulas derivable from the formulas in T 0 . Determine whether a property phi holds by a simple membership test of whether the formulas expressing phi is in set T .
Another example which uses the general-purpose speci cation language Ina Jo and its execution tool Inatest is given by 49 .
Inductive techniques
Unlike model checking approaches and general theorem proving techniques, Lawrence's inductive technique 26 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 imposes no restrictions on niteness. This techniques borrows the concept "trace" from model checking. Protocols are inductively de ned as sets of traces, which m a y i n volve many i n terleaved protocol runs. Accidents and attacks can also be modeled. Properties are proved by induction on traces over the protocol. The aim of this method is to prove guarantees. But when the guarantees are absent, possible attacks may be indicated. Compared with modal logic, the logic in this method needs long and highly detailed proofs. The inductive technique uses higher-order logic HOL as a typed set theory and standard predicate calculus as well. A theorem prover Isabelle 25 is used.
This methods applies similar idea to mathematical induction: P0 holds.
Px PSucx
To verify that Pevs holds for each trace evs, provided that a property P is preserved under all the rules for creating traces, two steps are needed:
i P c o vers empty trace.
ii For each o f the other rules, try to prove Pevs Pevevs. evevs is the trace that extends evs with event ev.
Some Future Research Areas
Hybrid Veri cation Techniques
Both proof-based techniques and model-checking techniques have their merits and demerits. Some researches have taken advantage of both of them by combining them. One idea is to use proof-based technique as a general framework and use model-checking as a mechanism to achieve automation. Dominique used such an approach 21 . He also used a certain version of the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol as an example. His approach includes three steps.
The rst step is to formally specify the protocol. Di erent "principals" involved in the protocol will be identi ed. These principals can be trusted or not trusted such a s a n i n truder. The formal speci cation contains the description of the trusted principals. The speci cation is in the form of a set of atomic actions. Because sending and receiving a piece of information is not synchronous, the NeedhamSchroeder protocol which has seven steps will be identi ed by 14 di erent atomic actions. The whole system is represented as a pair s 0 ; r , in which S 0 is the initial Formal veri cation techniques of security protocols 19 global state and r is a relation binding two global states before and after applying an action together.
The second step is to specify security properties. This approach employs a ltering function and an automaton. The former is to describe the visible actions and the latter is to specify the required sequencing of these visible actions. The ltering aims to focus on a certain session and the relevant actions for the chosen session; while the automaton is to place constraints on visible actions.
The third step is to automate. An abstraction function h : B ! B 0 is de ned. B 0 is a nite subset of B, which is the set of basic data. Users can de ne di erent B 0 when di erent properties of the protocol are considered. Then we can derive some other abstraction functions from h, and based on the abstract model, the veri cation can go on in an automatic way using a model-checking technique.
Methods to Solve In nite State Space Problem
During the process of generating the state space from an initial state of a protocol, the problem of in nite state space may occur if the system is not bounded. If any of the following occur, in nite state space will be generated 3 .
A. Some participants are able to perform unbounded steps in the protocol; B. Some participants may e n ter into in nitely many states; C. The set of participants is in nite; D. The set of messages received by a participant is in nite. Antti et al 3 propose a new method and a tool HPA1 Huima's Protocol Analyzer 1 based on symbolic state space search to deal with the analysis of an in nite state space if the in nite is only caused by D . T o reduce the complexity to space, Jeremy also proposes a method of embedding CSP trace theory within PVS. 34 .
Sometimes, even if the system itself is nite, in nite state space may b e generated. When the size of a system increases linearly, the state space of it may increase exponentially. To k eep the space under consideration nite, we must reduce the problem space according to a set of special concepts. Eric and Tsai 22 used compositional veri cation to tackle this problem. This technique makes use of the concepts of "composition" and "condensation" and aims to acquire an equivalent state space of much smaller size with respect to some properties. Then by analyzing a much smaller state space, conclusions about the properties of the original systems can be drawn. IOTA is a compositional veri cation tool designed and implemented by them. In 33 , IOTA is compared with other model checkers such as SMC, SMV, SPIN, in verifying problems such as Client-Server, Reader-Writer, and Dining-Philosopher. Those problems all have state space scale problems. The experimental data shows excellent performance of IOTA. So compositional verication technique has a high potential of dealing with the state space exploration problem.
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The aim of this research i s i n tended to provide a common speci cation interface for protocol analysis tools. If such a n i n terface can be agreed on by most researchers, the cost of using di erent tools to analyze a certain protocol and the discrepancy in speci cation will be reduced.
Conclusion
This survey paper rst introduces some standard security properties and a few speci c security properties of electronic commerce. Then several security protocols are categorized and illustrated. Because of the advantages of formal veri cation techniques in checking the correctness of security protocols, they are used widely to verify the security of a system. We describe three main methods and some realizing mechanisms.
Proof-based techniques use general or speci c logics as the basis for the verication of a protocol and can provide deep insight i n to the nature of the protocol design. But they have the disadvantage of not being automatic. Model-checking techniques, on the contrary, can be used automatically but lack insight into the protocol. Some hybrid methods are proposed to combine the advantages of these two kinds of veri cation techniques. Finally, w e i n troduce some research i n terests and directions in this area.
